Morsi vs SCAF?

After the announcement of Mohamed Morsi was elected president of Egypt there has been discussion as to what will happen next. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces obviously made a decision that ignoring the election result and giving the presidency to Ahmed Safiq would be a step to far, which the people might not tolerate.

Some have argued that Morsi said he was quitting the Brotherhood and inviting other parties into his government in the interests of a united country. But Robert Danin, a Middle East expert for CFR, is skeptical about Morsi’s bid to rule a united Egypt. ‘I don’t think Egyptians are buying it,’ says Danin. ‘The real test will come with the policies that he promulgates, and to whom he really turns.'” The article goes on to note that “he was the default candidate when Brotherhood leader Khairat al-Shater was barred from running”.

Others have noted that “Over the course of Egypt’s troubled transition, the Brotherhood has become increasingly, and uncharacteristically, assertive in its political approach. Renouncing promises not to seek the presidency and entering into an overt confrontation with the ruling military council, the Brotherhood’s bid to “save the revolution” has been interpreted by others as an all-out power grab. Egypt’s liberals, as well as the United States, now worry about the implications of unchecked Brotherhood rule”. Thankfully SCAF have stepped in to protect the Christian minority and check the powers of a totally untested Brotherhood. The article goes on to mention that “Under the repression of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, the Brotherhood’s unofficial motto was ‘participation, not domination.’ The group was renowned for its caution and patient (some would say too patient) approach to politics. When I sat down with Morsi in May 2010 — just months before the revolution and well before he could have ever imagined being Mubarak’s successor — he echoed the leadership’s almost stubborn belief in glacial but steady change”. Worryingly he goes on to say that “Like many Brotherhood leaders, he nurtured a degree of resentment toward Egypt’s liberals. They were tiny and irrelevant, the thinking went, so why were they always asking for so much? “. The article adds that “Historically, the Brotherhood has been one of the more consistent purveyors of anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment. While some Brotherhood leaders, particularly lead strategist Khairat El Shater, are less strident in their condemnations and less willfully creative with their conspiracy theories in private, Morsi is not”. Yet an organisation’s history may only have a minor impact on its modern day form, especially one as large as the Brotherhood.

Others have written that “‘complementary constitutional declaration‘ withdrew most powers from the presidency, rendering the position only slightly more politically relevant than the Queen of England. You may remember that the SCAF dissolved parliament last week by way of the constitutional court and effectively assumed legislative powers. It then arrogated to itself the authority to decide on all things military: appointing the minister of defense and army leaders, extending their terms, and making the president’s authority to declare war — traditionally exclusive to the commander-in-chief — conditional on the SCAF’s approval”. He concludes arguing that “There is also speculation that the Brotherhood will again cut a deal with the SCAF whereby they will acquiesce to the Constitutional Declaration in exchange for a Morsi presidency. If that happens, the Brotherhood would pull out its supporters, leaving the activists, outnumbered, to pay in blood in a possibly open confrontation with the military. All these elements mean that the main revolutionary groups and leaders are unlikely to come out in support of the Brotherhood on this one, both in distrust of the Islamists, but also in a bid to watch the SCAF and the Brotherhood weaken one another”.

Lastly, an article discusses Egypt’s constitutional crisis.  Although this is really only secondary to the various security issues that best the region. With Honsi Mubark chronically ill, his legacy is assessed.

4 Responses to “Morsi vs SCAF?”

  1. Egypt’s tilt to Iran? « Order and Tradition Says:

    […] safe to say that the Saudis preferred Egypt’s old order”. Yet, although there is significant evidence to support this view of compatibility between Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood it would be a mistake to say […]

  2. Decaying support « Order and Tradition Says:

    […] The report mentions that “Support for the organization is in the single digits among Turkish and Lebanese Muslims. In Jordan, just 15% express a positive opinion, essentially unchanged from last year, but down significantly from 34% in 2010″, yet worryingly it adds that “Al Qaeda receives its highest ratings in Egypt, where 21% hold a favorable and 71% an unfavorable opinion”. This is unusual as President Obama gave a speech in Cairo in which he explicitly rejected the premise that America was fighting against Muslims. The number of supporters in Egypt is particularly alarming as it comes at a time when the country is in a political transition with a new and untested president. […]

  3. Worth the expense? « Order and Tradition Says:

    […] also portrayed a unified front on their commitment toward democracy”. It will soon become apparent if either of these groups are renaging on this supposedly agreed […]

  4. “The beginnings of an alliance” « Order and Tradition Says:

    […] has been written about the role of the Egyptian army in Morsi’s Egypt. There has been much talk about this relationship but many are still understandably, […]

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: