Twice as dangerous

As Xi Jinping’s returns from his two week unexpected absence, Japanese ambassador to China dies suddenly  tensions continue to increase between the two historic foes over islands in the waters around them.

Some have argued that “The wave of anti-Japanese protests that swept across dozens of cities in China this weekend, prompted by Tokyo’s purchase of three disputed islands, has obscured a potentially more worrying development that risks drawing the two countries into a larger conflict: China’s adoption of a legal framework empowering it to expel foreign vessels in disputed waters in the East China Sea”.

She goes on to write that “Japan announced that it was finalizing the purchase of three of five uninhabited East China Sea islands — which Japan calls the Senkakus and China calls the Diaoyus. While the move was intended to prevent the hard-line, nationalist Tokyo governor from purchasing them himself, that distinction was apparently lost on Beijing, and Tokyo’s timing couldn’t have been worse”. She mentions that “Politburo members strongly denouncing Japan to Prime Minister Wen Jiabao vowing to ‘never yield an inch’ to threats of economic retaliation to announcements of joint combat drills by China’s navy, air force and strategic missile corps, including landing exercises in the Yellow Sea and the Gobi Desert”. These maximalist positions being taken, mostly by China, are deeply unhelpful to the process and will only hinder the cooling of tensions. Both sides now have more and more to lose by making statements such as these.

She goes on to argue that on 10 September China’s Foreign Ministry “announced baselines to formally demarcate its territorial waters in the area. In Beijing’s eyes, this move legally places the disputed islands under Chinese administration in a direct challenge to Japan’s administration of the islands over the last four decades. Since the islands reverted to Japanese government control in 1972, they have been administered by Japan. This move is a departure from China’s previous policy of seeking joint exploitation of resources with Japan through negotiation, and also differs from China’s approach to the South China Sea, where it has maintained calculated ambiguity with regard to its claims by not fully clarifying how much of the area China actually claims as its own”. Again China’s aggression is plain to see, allowing some flexibility only in certain places but more than willing to ramp up the pressure against themselves.

Crucially she goes on to add that “after the new baselines were declared, China sent six Chinese Maritime Ocean Surveillance vessels into disputed waters on what the Foreign Ministry said was a ‘rights defense law enforcement action.’ Not to be outdone, China’s second-largest maritime law enforcement agency, the Fisheries Administration, announced plans to patrol the disputed waters, starting with protection of 1,000 Chinese fishing boats that have just left for the area”. She adds realistically that “Many Chinese analysts suspect a deliberate attempt by Japan to disrupt the imminent transfer of leadership and destabilize it during a moment of vulnerability”. Then the question must be asked, why does China take the bait? Part of the answer is history, a lack of legitimacy and public pressure, but there are steps China could take to end this tension, if it so wished.

Yet as she masterfully explains “With growing domestic dissatisfaction with the widening wealth gap, widespread corruption, rising inflation, and housing prices, combined with rampant rumors about disunity in the leadership, Beijing feels it can’t be seen to be betraying national interests in the face of its historical nemesis”. She concludes ominously “a skirmish between official law enforcement vessels in the current context could prove irresolvable”.

In a separate but related piece, Bonnie Glaser argues regarding the US turn to Asia that “if U.S. policy toward this strategically important region is to be successful, it must take into account a paradox: China’s neighbors seek greater U.S. economic, diplomatic and military involvement in the region as a counterbalance to China’s growing power — but at the same time, every country in the region also desires a close relationship with Beijing”. She adds “Southeast Asian nations periodically urge Washington to help them stand up to Chinese pressure to accept Beijing’s expansive claims there — but when Washington acts to prevent China from running roughshod over the region, its partners’ concerns about U.S.-China tensions spike and they implore the United States to step back”. However, this paradox, will fade, or at least lessen if China’s behaviour continues that way it has been.

She goes on to mention that the South China Sea is disputed by all the nations but she adds importantly, “while no country is blameless in this standoff, China is clearly the most egregious aggressor. It is currently following a deliberate policy of bullying and intimidating its smaller neighbors into recognizing its sovereignty over large swathes of the sea”. She notes that the tensions are mounting with the most recent example being the row over the Scarborough Shoal.

She argues that ” Beijing has agreed to eventually enter into negotiations to reach a code of conduct for the South China Sea, Chinese officials have recently stated that discussions can only take place ‘when conditions are ripe’ — which, evidently, is not now”, the position of the United States is somewhat weakened in this matter as well. Worryingly she goes on to add that ” Beijing deliberately refused to abide by its verbal agreement with Manila to withdraw all its ships from the lagoon and the area around Scarborough Shoal, establishing a new status quo that favors Chinese interests. China is maintaining regular patrols and preventing Filipino fisherman from fishing in those waters. No country — including the United States — has publicly condemned this action. This has set a dangerous precedent for future negotiations”. If this is true, then on this point at least, America will have failed to assert itself by not standing up to China.

She goes on to write how China is using its (short lived) economic might to bully neighbours and others to do its bidding. She argues that “China’s rejection of a rules-based framework that would restrain the actions of all parties should be a cause for concern. Beijing calculates that time is on its side — why should it sign binding agreements now, when its leverage is only poised to grow? In the future, China will not only be a major economic power, but also a major political and military power”. The first point that China rejects the rules based framework is correct and rightly disagrees with some, notably, Liberal Leviathan written by John Ikenberry. Secondly, China future economic, political and military power, as has been discussed here before will wane over the next two decades, if not sooner.

She concludes arguing that China’s incoming leaders will decide how the country acts. However, it may not have much choice if forced into war by an angry populace and an illegitimate government. To the dismay of China’s neighbours she posits the theory that Xi Jinping “is widely believed to have a high degree of self-confidence” adding later that he thinks “that China is rising quickly. Confident in the belief that the gap between United States and Chinese power is narrowing, Xi is likely to stand up for Chinese interests in the international arena”.

If this is the case and Xi is really as assertive as she thinks then the next decade could be very violent indeed.