The power of deterrence

Jennifer Lind writes in Foreign Affairs about the the pivot and what should be left to the Chinese, “The United States’ promises to protect its allies in East Asia underwrite the region’s security. Yet whispers about the credibility of those promises are growing louder. China, meanwhile, continues to assert its claims to disputed islands in the East China and South China Seas through so-called salami tactics: making one provocative move after another, as if taking a salami slice by slice. Each provocation slightly enhances China’s position but is too small to merit a forceful response. Many commentators argue that the United States must enhance deterrence by making clearer and stronger commitments to its allies. But the United States will not solve its problems in East Asia by declaring itself in lockstep with its allies. For guidance, U.S. policymakers should instead look to a previous case that the United States managed successfully: West Berlin during the Cold War. In that case, a major power — the Soviet Union — was also pushing, pressuring, and trying to divide the United States from its allies. Washington solved the problem by standing firm in the face of both sides. The Kennedy administration clarified the vital interests that it would fight to protect, while explaining to its West German ally that the United States would not fight to achieve every German goal in the standoff”.

The argument Lind makes sounds too good to be true. Reappraise what US interests are and leave the rest to the Chinese. One of the most obvious dangers is in the analogy with the USSR and China and the Cold War. America and the USSR balanced each other out and created broad stability, if America were to do what Lind suggests it would be read in China as America believing its own “decline” and even worse would then feed into China’s obviously mistaken belief that it is “rising“.

She goes on to write, “In the coming years, territorial disputes between China and its neighbours will create tension, crisis, and possible conflict in East Asia. In the South China Sea, Beijing asserts sovereignty over an area (enclosed by the so-called nine-dashed line) in which six nearby countries — Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam — maintain competing territorial claims of their own. In the East China Sea, China has claimed sovereignty over the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands (which the Chinese call the Diaoyu Islands). It will prove difficult to settle these disputes through negotiations; the countries involved have issued a bewildering tangle of competing legal and historical claims, and the contested islets have become a rallying cry for nationalist politicians. Moreover, many of the territories in question come with rich fishing grounds and are thought to lie near substantial oil and natural gas deposits. These disputes have intensified in recent years”.

Her prediction of increased tension in Asia has already come true, almost entirely due to Chinese aggression which is producing predictable results.  Some states have taken a more legal approach but will ultimately have to strengthen its defences.

Lind returns to the Cold War anology, “it’s the Americans who fear entanglement, in an unwanted and potentially devastating war with China. Given this profound change, it is unsurprising that U.S. allies question Washington’s commitment to their security. In March, for example, the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun discussed how increasing tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu were leading many Japanese observers to cite “the unreliability of Japan’s main ally.” Responding to such doubts, Washington has reiterated its commitment to Japan’s security in broad terms. U.S. President Barack Obama and other U.S. officials have announced that although Washington does not take a position on the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, its security guarantee for Japan would apply to attacks against the islands because they are “administered by Japan.” In the South China Sea, Washington has similarly declared its neutrality on territorial claims, but it has not stated that the United States would support the Philippines militarily in the event of conflict. This approach only invites more challenges. Simply declaring that the United States will defend areas administered by Japan does not address the core strategic problem that Washington and Tokyo face — China can still use salami tactics to harass and provoke. In Washington, such acts will simply be seen as annoyances; but in Tokyo, they will be perceived as infringements on Japanese sovereignty, and will continue to raise doubts among Japanese that the Americans may not protect them. As a result, the alliance will weaken”.

The liklihood of a Sino-US war are slim. Even if the two countries do go to war, which despite what the theory says, is not likely America will have little to fear and perhaps even much to gain. China’s military is weak, disorganised, corrupt and there is no certainty that it could beat Japan, let alone America in a war. As to her claim that America is an unrealiable ally firstly it should be said that Japan has no where else to go, but more importantly America is treaty bound to defend Japan should it come under an attack.

Lind goes on to argue that “In East Asia today, the challenge for Washington is to distinguish vital U.S. interests from the rubber stamps — and to convey those distinctions to U.S. allies and partners. Here’s one way that might be done. In the East China Sea, the United States has committed itself to defending the territory that Japan administers, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Chinese provocations — such as flying aircraft over the islands or sending ships through disputed waters — are annoyances. They do not seize for Beijing the finite benefits of ownership. But if China were to build civilian or military structures on those islands, encamp troops or establish settlements, or extract finite resources from the islands, Beijing would be taking assets that Japan believes it owns. If China were to build a pier on one of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, for instance, the United States should help Japan disassemble it — just as they would if China built a pier on Okinawa”.

She writes “The situation is different in the South China Sea, as Washington has not promised to defend the Philippines’ territorial claims there. Whether the U.S.-Philippine alliance is sufficiently important to justify a U.S. guarantee for Manila’s claims remains an open question. But one can still distinguish symbolic issues from important American interests when it comes to Philippine claims in the South China Sea. When Beijing harasses Philippine ships, it’s regrettable. But when China seeks to reap the benefits of ownership — by establishing settlements and extracting resources, for example — it crosses a meaningful threshold. The key insight here is not what constitutes core interests versus rubber stamps — but simply that Washington must distinguish between them. Today, it has become commonplace for pundits to argue that everything matters, everything is interconnected, and slippery slopes abound.”

What she fails to understand however is the importance of deterrence. Secondly she again uses the Cold War analogy incorrectly. The world of the Cold War is long gone and thus it has little relevance to modern thinking in a world dominated by the United States.

She ends “The brilliance of the Kennedy administration’s approach to Berlin was that it simultaneously neutralized Soviet salami tactics and strengthened the U.S. alliance with West Germany. Honest talk between the United States and its partners in East Asia could similarly strengthen their relationships — while thwarting China’s efforts to divide them”.